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A consumer-choice model developed by Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992) is
utilized to study the regional effects of terrorism on competitors’ market shares
in tourism sector where involved countries enjoy significant tourism activities
but are subject to high frequency of terrorist attacks. The theoretical model is
tested for three Mediterranean countries, namely Greece, Israel, and Turkey,
for the period from January 1996 to December 1999, using the seemingly
unrelated regression model. Italy is used as a control variable in estimations,
acting as a proxy for tourist activities in the rest of the Mediterranean region
and providing an additional destination for tourists to visit. Evidence indicates
that the tourism industry in Israel and Turkey are more sensitive to terrorism
incidents than in Greece. There are also significant regional contagion effects
of terrorism. We find that a higher level of terrorist incidents in Greece is
associated with an increase in the relative market share of Israel in the region,
while terrorism in Israel benefits Turkey’s market share. We also document
evidence that the location (urban versus rural) and the intensity of terrorist
incidents play an important role in the decision-making process of tourists for
choice of destinations. Policy implications of our findings are also discussed.
Keywords: Terrorism, Mediterranean tourism, time series, seemingly
unrelated regression.
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1. Introduction
International tourism is one of the world’s largest industries and many
small, open economies heavily rely on tourism as a major source of foreign
exchange earnings. In addition to its direct benefits, such as foreign exchange
earnings, tourism is also a source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in many
developing countries. 
Terrorism can hurt the tourism sector by reducing tourist arrivals. Over
time, continued terrorist attacks may also reduce FDI significantly. Besides
such direct short- and long-term costs, indirect costs of terrorism include the
need for greater advertising expenses to attract new or more tourists,
reconstruction costs for damaged tourist facilities, and security enforcement
expenses to lessen terrorist threats. Major airports in Europe and
Mediterranean have had to made costly improvements in security in response
to growing terrorist attacks. Most insurance companies now exclude coverage
for losses suffered through terrorist-related injuries or losses (Hall, 1995),
passing the cost of terrorism directly on tourists and the owners of tourist
facilities.
Terrorism is more likely to have detrimental effects on tourist arrivals in
countries with significant terrorist incidents. This paper examines some
selected countries in the Mediterranean region that have a high incidence of
terrorism. For example, Turkey has been facing several terrorist
organizations, including the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders/Front, Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK), and Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army
(TIKKO). Periodic bomb attacks and shootings by the PKK especially in
Turkey during the 1990’s have had a likely negative effect on tourist arrivals.2
In one such attack, a woman set off a bomb outside of an army barracks in
East Turkey in December 1998, killing herself and a passer-by and injuring
twenty-two people seriously. A month earlier, a bomb had exploded on a bus
in central Turkey, killing four passengers and injuring seventeen, and a PKK
suicide bomber killed herself with a bomb strapped to her body, killing 6
people outside a police station in southeast Turkey. These attacks came as a
response to the arrest in Italy of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in
November 1998. According to Hall (1995), the number of tourists from the
U.K. alone was expected to decline by 20 percent, as a result of the threat of
Kurdish terrorism in Turkey. 
1 This figure is quite significant, given that the
tourism sector accounts for about 25 percent of Turkey’s foreign currency
earnings (Hall, 1995).
In addition to regular attacks by PKK and others, Turkey recently has
been subject to new terrorist incidents due to the political instability in the
region. For example, on May 2001 a hostage taking by 12 gunmen at a five-
star Swiss-owned hotel in Istanbul to protest Russian military action in
Chechnya added to the growing concern for Turkey’s tourism industry, which
hosted 10 million tourists who brought in $8 billion in 2000 into Turkey’s
economy (Toros, 2001).  
At the same time, the Middle East conflict has likely disturbed the
tourism sector activities in Israel. On February 14, 2001, a Palestinian driver
crashed into a group of soldiers and civilians waiting at a bus stop south of
Tel-Aviv, killing eight and injuring 20. A bomb on an urban bus injured 14
people in Tel-Aviv in December 28, 2000. The explosion occurred in the
vicinity of the Israel diamond centre. In analysing the impact of recent3
incidents on economic activity in Israel, Piterman (2000), who is in charge of
foreign currency operations at the Bank of Israel argues that “the most
immediate and the strongest effects of the [terrorist] events is that on tourism
(p.1). 
Greece is another country that has been subject to significant terrorist
incidents in recent years. On June 8, 2000, two gunmen on a motorcycle shot
British Military Attaché, Brigadier Stephen Saunders.  Four bombs exploded in
central Athens to protest against a visit to Greece by President Clinton on
November 10, 1999. A month later, on October 4, 1999, three gasoline bombs
were thrown at a McDonald's restaurant close to Athens.
This paper investigates the impact of terrorism during 1990’s on tourist
arrivals for three Mediterranean countries, Greece, Israel and Turkey. We
focus on these countries for several reasons. First, tourism revenues
constitute an important part of GDP in each country. Second, East
Mediterranean Europe has an important world market share in terms of tourist
income receipts. In 1999, Turkey, Greece, and Israel had a world market
share of 1.8, 3.2, and 0.6 percent of tourist arrivals, respectively (World
Tourist Organization, 2001). Third, as suggested by the examples of terrorist
incidents above, these countries have became the center of terrorist activities
by certain organized terrorist organisations during the last decade, including
the PKK activities in Turkey, the Middle East conflict in Israel, and the left
extremist groups, such as the N17, in Greece. As such, these countries offer a
unique laboratory for studying the impact of terrorist activities on the tourism
sector. 4
Looking forward, empirical findings presented in this paper justify the
concerns that terrorism hurts tourism. In addition we find that some countries
in the Mediterranean may gain from the problems of their neighbours in that
their relative market shares increase as some tourists substitute away from
high-risk places towards low-risk locations as the intensity of terrorist incidents
increases in a given country. Overall, our study offers additional evidence
from the 1990’s and uses a new set of countries on the impact of terrorism on
the tourism sector and on its contagion effects in a region.  The findings
developed here are of practical use for policymakers, helping them design
effective domestic or region-wide strategies against terrorism.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief
review of the literature and outline our major contribution. In Section 3, we
present a theoretical framework to motivate our empirical methodology, which
is described in Section 4. Empirical findings are reported in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 discusses the policy implications of our findings and concludes the
paper.
2. Literature Review
The literature on the impact of terrorism on tourism is scant.
2 To our
knowledge, only two studies, by Enders and Sandler (1991) and Enders et al.
(1992), provide empirical evidence on the link between terrorism and the
tourism sector for a sample of European countries. Using monthly data from
1970 to 1988 and employing a vector autoregressive analysis (VAR), Enders
and Sandler (1991) find a significant negative impact of terrorism on tourism in
Spain. Enders et al. (1992) study a large sample of European countries during
the 1974-88 period.  They employ an ARIMA technique with a transfer5
function and construct a forecasting model for the share of tourism in these
countries. Using quarterly data, they conclude that terrorist incidents have an
adverse effect on tourism revenues in Europe and that tourists substitute
away from some countries to others to minimize the risk of experiencing
terrorist incidents. Our evidence in this paper supports these conclusions.
The current study differs from the earlier studies in a number of
significant ways. First, we extend the influential work of Enders et al. (1992)
by testing the cross-country effects of terrorism on tourist arrivals in the
Mediterranean region, which has had growing terrorism incidents. In other
words, we explore whether terrorism affects regional competition in the tourist
industry. We hypothesize that a higher frequency of occurrence of terrorist
incidents in one country will divert tourists to each competitor(s) and
consequently, that will be reflected in relative market shares. 
Second, our theoretical framework accommodates the testing of other
interesting hypotheses. For example, we test whether the competition
between the three countries can be approximated by a 'zero-sum' game. In
other words, we test whether a declining market share due to terrorist
incidents (if such a relationship exists) is diffused into the country's
competitors' shares at a one-to-one rate. 
Third, we provide evidence from Mediterranean countries, while the
focus of previous studies is on a sample of European countries, which also
includes Greece. However, countries like Israel and Turkey are not
investigated in the literature despite the growing intensity of terrorist incidents
in these countries and the critical role played by the tourism sector in their
domestic economy. 6
Fourth, we provide evidence from the 1990’s whereas the earlier
studies cover the 1970’s and 1980’s. This is important, because the intensity
of terrorist incidents has especially increased during the last decade,
especially in Turkey, and terrorist incidents have taken place more in urban
areas in terms of suicide bombs. Therefore, we also examine whether the
location (urban versus rural) and the intensity of terrorist incidents could have
a different impact on tourists’ decision to select a destination of their choice. 
Fifth, unlike earlier work, we use Italy in our empirical and theoretical
frameworks as a control country, representing the rest of the Mediterranean
region, to estimate the effects of terrorism on others’ market shares in the
region. 
3  
Finally, following the earlier work, we utilize an autoregressive model,
but we use a more suitable estimation methodology, namely, the seemingly
unrelated regression (SURE) method. This method has an important
advantage over the previously employed OLS models in that it accounts for
the cross-country correlations of disturbances in individual models. This issue
becomes more important when the individual sectors studied are expected to
be highly substitutable as in our case. 
3. Theoretical Framework
The analysis focuses on the effect of terrorism on the competition for
tourism services in the Mediterranean. We test for the interaction between
three of the most popular tourist destinations in the region: Greece, Israel and
Turkey. In particular, we explore the effect of terrorism, measured by the
number of terrorist attacks (TA), on the dynamics of the relative market share7
of each of the three countries. Our theoretical framework follows the
consumer choice approach employed by Enders et al. (1992).
4
In our framework we assume that there is a three-way competition,
where we ignore the effects running from/to other countries. However, if we
were to define relative market shares that would add up to unity, this would
guarantee that there will always be gross substitutability between at least two
countries in a deterministic way.
5 To avoid any spurious correlations we
augment the tourist destinations considered by including Italy.
6 Although
Italy’s market share is not modelled per se, it plays the highly significant role
of the ‘safe’ benchmark.
7  Thus, for each month the (total) market is defined
as the sum of the number of tourists entering the four countries. The relative
market share, for each country, is defined as the ratio of that country's number
of tourists to the total market. Defining TB,t TG,t, TT,t, and TI,t as the number of
tourists visiting Italy (the benchmark), Greece, Turkey and Israel, respectively,
at time t, we can express the 'total' market, Mt, is as:
t B t I t T t G t T T T T M , , , , + + + =  (1)
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Where j = Greece, Turkey, Israel, and Italy. 
8
The theoretical rationale behind our analysis is that consumers, who
are also tourists, take terrorism into account in their spending decisions.
Following the theoretical framework utilized by Enders et al. (1992), we
assume a two-stage budget framework in which rational consumers make a
spending decision between tourist and other activities based on the price8
index for tourism and the price of other goods. In the first stage, consumers
determine their total spending on total tourism-related activities subject to a
given budget constraint. In the second stage, they divide their expenditures on
tourism among countries to be visited.  Any increase in terrorist incidents in a
particular country causing a relatively higher risk would bring about a standard
substitution effect from this country to those of low-risk locations, including
Italy.
Our theoretical framework assumes that each country's market share
depends on a set of state variables (X), possibly country-specific, such as
infrastructure, level of services, weather and amount of available endowment
used to market tourist services. Although these state variables are bound to
be critical for a country's market share, in our analysis they are taken as
given, since our focus is on the effect (if any) of terrorism, which we introduce
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where  f is a continuous, differentiable function and S represents each
country's market share at time t. The effect of domestic terrorism on each
country's share is measured by the first derivative of f with respect to TA, the9










where  g is a constant, capturing the effect of domestic terrorism on Greece.
Similarly, the overall effect of a terrorist incident, say in Greece, will
have a direct effect on Greece (given by equation 4) and two indirect effects
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where i and t are constants capturing the effect of Greek terrorism on Israel
and Turkey, respectively. 
9 Thus, we are predominantly interested in
investigating whether terrorism affects competition. In other words, we test










A natural extension of this model would be to test for the direction of
substitution, that is, to test, for instance, whether a decline in Greek market
share results in increases in both its competitors' shares or only one of them.









































Finally, we test whether the three-way competition among the countries












































 (8)    
We can now further discuss the importance of considering Italy as the
benchmark in our model. In particular, by doing so we allow the decision
makers (tourists) to have two distinct choices depending on the level of their
risk aversion. According to our hypothesis, an increase in terrorist attacks in
one country (higher level of risk) can induce two alternative outcomes. It can
either result in a substitution effect whereby tourists substitute away that
country’s services toward one of other competitors, provided they are gross
substitutes, or switches away from the risky destination in favor of the safe
one, in our case Italy. 
10
For a given level of risk aversion, moderate increases in a tourist
destination’s riskiness trigger a substitution effect among risky destinations,
while a significant increase in the perceived riskiness might result in a discrete
change in the consumer’s decision in favour of the safe destination. Similarly,
for a given level of destination riskiness, changes in attitude towards risk 
11
(risk aversion) might produce the same set of alternative outcomes depending
on the size of the change. 
Finally, from an econometric point of view a negative effect of terrorism
on a country’s share does not necessarily increase its competitors’ shares,
since it might be absorbed by the benchmark’s share, in which case it would
not affect competition among the risky destination, at least in the way defined11
in our context. In the following section, we present a more complete
description of the hypotheses to be tested and also explain our econometric
methodology.
4. Methodology and Hypotheses
We specify a time series model and estimate it by the seemingly
unrelated regressions (SURE) model (Zellner, 1962). The model with raw
shares is as follows:
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where S is each country's market share at time t, TA is the number of terrorist
incidents in each country, the α's, β's, γ's are constant estimable parameters.
Greece, Turkey and Israel are represented by (G), (T) and (I), respectively.
Finally, u terms in the system of equations (9) are well-behaved disturbance
terms, which we allow to be correlated across individual countries (equations).   
Obviously, in our context, we are interested in the value and the statistical
significance of the γ's which capture the impact of terrorism on relative market
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We employ two subscripts to represent the own and cross-country
effect. The elements on the main diagonal represent the effect of domestic
terrorism on the same country’s market share. The off-diagonal elements
capture the cross-country impacts. For instance, γT,I would capture the effect
of Turkish terrorism on Israel’s market share. There is no theoretical reason to
believe that the impact matrix, Γ, would be symmetric. However, for
completeness we initially allow for non-symmetry, essentially leaving Γ
unconstrained, while later we impose symmetry, which we test by the means
of a Likelihood Ratio test.
The dynamics specified in the model seek to capture the time series
behaviour of the variables of interest rather than to mirror a particular
structural model. For instance, in the system of equations (9), the dependent
variables are lagged two periods in order to account for the observed time
dependence in the series. 
This specification allows for a number of hypotheses to be tested. First,
it encompasses the specification utilized in Enders et al. (1992) by explicitly
accommodating the effect of terrorism in a country relative to its market share.
Additionally, it can be used for testing cross-country effects of terrorism. More
formally, we test the following set of hypotheses, all of which are equivalent to
imposing linear restrictions on the impact matrix, Γ:
H1: Terrorism does not exert any impact on the demand for tourist
services of a country and therefore does not affect relative market
shares. Consequently, the risk of terrorism is not priced in equilibrium
and Γ is the null matrix.  
We test this by testing the following null hypothesis:13
0 H T I G I I T G T I G T G I I T T G G 0 = = = = = = = = = , , , , , , , , , : γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ           
Rejecting this hypothesis would imply that consumers do indeed factor the
terrorism record of a country into their decision process, and such a
consideration of risk translates into changes in market shares. 
H2: The effect of domestic terrorism on domestic market share is
uniform across countries. 
This is examined by testing the following null hypothesis:
I I T T G G 0 H , , , : γ γ γ= =           
Not rejecting the hypothesis would imply that the cost of terrorism is the same
for each country in the region. Rejection of the hypothesis would suggest that
there is a country-specific cost for terrorism. 
H3: A given country's terrorism does not affect its competitors'
markets shares.  
This is investigated by testing the following hypotheses for each country
individually as well as jointly for the system:
(Joint)     
(Israel)       
(Turkey)      
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Furthermore, testing for the individual significance of these coefficients
can uncover which countries' tourism services can be viewed as being gross
substitutes. For instance, a positive sign for γG,T would imply that Greece's
market share responds to terrorist incidents in Turkey. In this sense, one may
thus conclude that tourists view the tourist services of the two countries as14
gross substitutes. Evidence obtained from the testing of these hypotheses,
however, can allow us to make further inferences about whether the time path
of market shares is statistically related to terrorism incidents in the domestic
country as well as to those in its competitors.
H4: Terrorism's effects on country market shares constitute a
zero-sum game.
We assess the validity of this by testing the following hypotheses for
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5. Empirical Results
5.1.  Data
Monthly data on the number of tourist visits were collected for the
period from January 1996 to December 1999, with 48 data points. The choice
for the sample period is dictated by data availability. Data ends in December
1999, because tourism statistics are published with a significant lag.
The Greek and Israeli National Tourism Organisations kindly provided
tourism data for Greece and Israel, respectively. For Turkey, they were
retrieved from the Data Delivery System (DDS) of the Central Bank of Turkey,
while data for Italy were obtained from the National Statistical Institute15
(Instituto Nazionale Di Statistica). Data on terrorist attacks were obtained from
the International Terrorism Database (ITD) of the International Policy Institute
(http://www.ict.org.il/). The terrorist incidents considered in our analysis are
summarized in Table 1.
Bombing and suicide bomb attacks dominate the terrorist incidents
reported in Table 1. Shooting between terrorists and military are particularly
evident in Israel.  The rest of the incidents are unevenly distributed across the
countries. Turkey faces a diversified type of the terrorist incidents while a
narrower type of incidents such as bombing, setting of incendiary devices, and
rocket attacks take place in Greece. Israel has the highest number of
incidents while Greece and Turkey share a similar number of terrorist actions.      
5.2.  Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
The descriptive statistics for the relative market shares for the four
countries are reported in Table 2.
12 Italy has the biggest market share of
about 61 percent while Israel has the smallest with around 5 percent. Turkey
and Greece share a similar market share of about 16-18 percent. Note that
Greece has the highest standard deviation among the four countries,
indicating that its market share is subject to greater and more sudden
changes. On the other hand, Israel has the lowest standard deviation,
indicating a relatively more stable market share.
Table 3 reports the sample correlation matrix. The unconditional
sample bivariate correlations for the market shares indicate that Greece's
market share is strongly negatively correlated both with that of Turkey's as
well as that of Israel's. This would suggest that Greece's tourist services are16
viewed as gross substitutes for those supplied by Turkey and Israel. In
contrast, tourism services between Turkey and Israel exhibit positive
correlation, suggesting that consumers view them as complements. 
We expect that our series have a strong seasonal component and
might even contain a seasonal unit root. In such cases, the standard practice
is to seasonally difference the series in order to remove the seasonal
stochastic trend and consequently induce stationarity. However, in our case
due to the relatively small sample, resorting to seasonal differencing would be
very costly in terms of the loss of degrees of freedom. Bearing this in mind, we
are sensitive to evidence of residual non-whiteness. Especially, we carefully
monitor the residual autocorrelation in order to pick up higher degrees of
persistence in their behaviour that would indicate spuriousness of our
regression model. As will become apparent in the next section, the estimated
residuals satisfy the standard diagnostic tests.  In any case, for completeness
and as a means for conducting sensitivity analysis we estimate the system of
equations of model (9) by employing alternative specifications for the
dependent variable: (i) ‘raw’ market shares with and without seasonal
dummies as regressors, (ii) seasonally adjusted market shares, and (iii)
seasonally differenced market shares.     
5.3  Estimation Results
The system of equations in model (9) was estimated by SURE for the
period from January 1996 to December 1999. In Tables 4a and 4b we report
the estimation results for the raw market shares, without and with including
(eleven) seasonal dummies. 17
A number of interesting findings are worth mentioning. First, when
seasonal dummies are excluded the model captures the time series behaviour
of country shares relatively well, explaining between 66 percent and 80
percent of their variations. Additionally, a battery of diagnostics indicates that
the residuals satisfy the basic OLS assumptions regarding the whiteness of
the error term.
13 When the seasonal dummies are included the model’s
explanatory power, as expected, increases significant and typically is above
93%. The two models provide very similar point estimates as well as statistical
significance for the parameters of interest so we will adopt the more
parsimonious of the two, the one without seasonal dummies, to save degrees
of freedom. 
14
Focusing on our best specification in Table 4a, it is obvious that the
time series properties of all three countries' market shares display a similar
structure, exhibiting very strong positive first order dependence with point
estimates for βj,1 between 1.10 and 1.20 and negative second-order
dependence with point estimates for βj,2 between –0.39 and –0.64. Regarding
the own effect of domestic terrorism, our findings indicate that terrorist attacks
exert a negative impact on market share of the country in which they occur. 
15
The estimated coefficients were -1.07 (p-value 0.14) for Greece (γG,G), -0.78
(p-value 0.06) for Turkey (γT,T), and -0.44 (p-value 0.01) for Israel (γI,I). In other
words, a terrorist incident in Greece results in, on average, 1 percent decline
in its relative market share. 
16 For the case of Israel the impact is on average
a decline of 0.44 percent, while for Turkey it is a drop of 0.78 percent.
Regarding the effect of cross-country terrorism on relative market shares (γi,j),
all but one of the relevant estimated coefficients attained a positive sign,18
which is consistent with the hypothesis of gross substitutability. A closer look
however, reveals that the only statistically significant relationships are
documented between Greece and Israel (γI,G) and Turkey and Israel (γT,I). In
particular, a higher frequency of terrorist incidents in Greece is associated
with an increase in the relative market share of Israel. Similarly, our findings
indicate that an increase in terrorist incidents in Israel result in a gain of about
0.7 percent for Turkey (p-value 0.1). In other words, Turkey’s market share
increases on average by 0.7 percent due to a terrorist incident in Israel. 
Turning attention again to the case of Greece and Israel 
17, we attempt
to quantify the impact on Israel’s market share. The coefficient's point
estimate, 1.01, implies that the occurrence of a terrorist incident in Greece
results on, an average, gain of about 1 percent in Israel's market share. This
result suggests strong substitutability between the two countries' tourist
services. A terrorist incident in Greece results in about 1 percent decrease in
its own relative market share while it increases Israel's share by the same
amount, suggesting an almost one-to-one substitutability. In fact, a test of
equality (in absolute value) for these two coefficients was not rejected with a
probability value of 0.94.   
The estimated coefficient (1.01) shows that Israel gains on average by
1.01 percent due to terrorism in Greece. Given that the average number of
tourists entering the four-country market per month is about 4.5 million people,
we can deduce that on average a terrorist incident in Greece results in 45
thousand tourists switching to Israel. We can further provide some monetary
cost figures of terrorism based on 1999 figures. 
18  Given that in 1999 Greece
had 8.8 billion in US dollars tourist income and about 12 million tourists, then19
the average tourist expenditure was about 733 US Dollars. The number of
tourists who visited the four countries was almost 58 million in 1999 and a 1
percent market share of this would be equivalent to 580 thousand tourists.
Thus, the loss for Greece in pecuniary terms would approximately be 425
million in US Dollars (580,000 tourists * 733 US Dollars) per annum or $35
million per month. 
 The results of the formal hypotheses H1-H4 discussed earlier are
reported in Table 5.  We are able to reject H1 implying that terrorism indeed
exerts an effect on the tourist industry of the three Mediterranean countries.
By not rejecting H2, we also conclude that this effect is uniform across the
three countries. Thus, decision makers, tourists, factor the risk of terrorism in
this process and also respond in a homogeneous way, effectively using the
same risk assessment criteria for different countries. 
The null hypothesis of H3d was rejected, suggesting that cross-country
terrorism affects competitors' market shares. Inspection of the disaggregated
hypotheses (H3a-H3c) reveals that the main cause of this rejection is Greece,
whose terrorism seems to benefit Israel's market share. This finding also
verifies our previous conclusion reached by inspecting the individual
coefficients from the estimation (see Table 4). 
Turning now our attention to the hypotheses for H4a-c, we were able to
reject H4b and H4c. Thus our findings suggest that a zero-sum game between
Greece and its competitors exists. Utilising the inference from H3 we can
further conclude that the only non-trivial zero-sum game seems to exist
between Greece and Israel. 
19 20
 
6.  Further Evidence: Decomposing terrorist incidents
Our principal measure of terrorist activity, the number of terrorist
incidents  t TA  within a given month, is crudely aggregated. In this section, an
attempt is made to disaggregate terrorist incidents into different categories in
order to test whether a particular geographic location in which a terrorist
attack takes place (urban vs. rural) and the intensity of the attacks, measured
by the number of fatal casualties, affect tourist activities differently.  In order to
capture any potential differential effects with respect to the location of the
incident and its intensity we adopt the following estimation strategies. 
Conditional
20 on the occurrence of a terrorist incident, we define the
following two geographic dummies:
=
=
1 1 , if the incident took place in an urban area




2 1 , if the incident took place in a rural area
        0, otherwise 
GD
Additionally, in order to capture the effects of the intensity of the attack we




1 1 , if there were no casualties




2 1 , if the number of casualties   3




3 1 , if the number of casualties > 3
        0, otherwise 
LD
For each country, we estimate two models:21
() ( ) ( ) 01 1 2 2    ** tt t t Market Share a TA GD TA GD u αα =+ + +             (11)
and 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 1 2 2 3 3    *** ttt t t Market Share a TA LD TA LD TA LD u ββ β =+ + + +            (12)
where the total effect of terrorism on the market share is  12 αα +  for equation
(11), while for equation (12) it is  123 βββ ++ . We can test whether tourists
discount the location of the terrorist incident differently by testing the
significance of the ' s α . Similarly, we can test whether the intensity of terrorist
activity matters for consumers by testing the significance of the individual 's β .
Finally, we can test whether the effect of the level of terrorism is uniform by
testing the null hypothesis that  123 βββ == . If we reject this null, then we
would have found evidence of asymmetries.
21
6.1 Empirical Results
6.1.1. Intensity of Attacks
To test the significance of terrorist activity in terms of its intensity we
estimate the following specification for each country in our sample. 
() () () ()
() () () ()
() ()
0 1 1,1 2 2,1 1 ,1 1,1 2 ,1 2,1 3 ,1 3,1 ,1
1 ,2 1,2 2 ,2 2,2 3 ,2 3,2 1 ,3 1,3
2, 3 2 , 33, 3 3 , 3
 ***
              * * * *
              * *
tt t t t t
tttt
tt t
S a S S TA LD TA LD TA LD
TA LD TA LD TA LD TA LD
TA LD TA LD u
φφ β β β
γγ γδ
δδ
−− =+ + + + + +
++ +++
+++
                      
                                                                                                                                             (13)
The estimation results for all three countries are reported in Table 6.
Inspecting the results on a general level, one observes that the basic findings
we report in the previous sections of the paper hold. For instance, the fit of the
estimated models is comparable to that of those from the previous section.22
Similarly the residuals are consistent with a white noise process and the
autoregressive nature of market shares is maintained.
Moving to the parameters of interest, consistent with our priors, all
coefficients ( 's β ) capturing the effect of domestic terrorist activity on domestic
market share carry the correct sign, being negative. Similarly, the coefficients
measuring cross-country effects ( 's γ  and  's δ ) also carry the correct sign
22
(positive) providing evidence for imperfect substitutability between the three
countries’ tourist services conditional on terrorist activity. 
Starting with the case of Greece, terrorist attacks in urban
23 areas exert
a significant negative effect on Greece’s market share. The point estimate of
1,G β  is -1.37 suggesting that the occurrence of a terrorist attack in central
Athens on average reduces Greek market share by 1.37%. The coefficients of
cross-county effects are more informative, however. Greece’s market share is
sensitive to the occurrence of fatal terrorist incidents in Turkey. In particular,
the estimate of  2,T γ   was 1.81 and significant implying that when a fatal
terrorist incident takes place in Turkey the Greek market share increases
about 1.81%. In general, our findings indicate that terrorist activity in Turkey,
unless it is intensive enough involving fatal casualties, seems not to affect
competition. With respect to terrorist activity in Israel, there seems to be only a
marginally significant (at the 10% level) gain for Greek market share of about
1.28%. The Greek market share is insensitive to higher levels of intensity of
terrorism in Israel and only responsive to the general level of terrorism as
measured by the number of incidents.
Turning now our attention to the case of Israel, there is strong evidence
for asymmetries in the effect of domestic terrorist activity’s intensity on Israel’s23
market share. In particular, our findings document that there is a significant
negative effect on domestic market share as a result of the general level of
terrorist activity ( 1,I β  estimate of -0.97) but also as a result of extreme intensity
(more than 3 fatal casualties) as measured by the estimate of  3,I β  (-0.78).
Hence, the total loss in terms of market share is on average about 1.75%.
With regards to cross-country effects, Israel gains significantly from urban
terrorist activity in Greece, again on average 1.19 %. ( 1,G γ =1.19).  This finding
verifies our earlier conclusion for strong substitutability between Israel and
Greece when conditioning on terrorist activity. Finally, no significant cross
effects were uncovered running from Turkey to Israel. 
As far as Turkey is concerned, asymmetric effect is also documented. It
is only intense domestic terrorist activity that exerts a significant negative
impact on its market share. Specifically, the estimate of  3,T β  indicates an
average loss of 0.69% in terms of market share. Significant cross-country
gains were also documented running both from Greece and Israel. For
instance, Turkey’s market share gains on average 1.23% (estimate of 1,G γ ) due
to urban terrorist activity in Greece. Additionally, Turkey’s market share is
responsive to terrorist incidents in Israel involving fatal casualties (estimate of
2,I δ  1.78).
6.1.2. Geographic Area of Attacks
In order to assess whether the location of terrorist incidents is of
statistical importance we estimate the following specification. 
() () () ( )
() () ()
0 1 1,1 2 2,1 1 ,1 1,1 2 ,1 2,1 1 ,2 1,2 ,1
2, 2 2 , 21, 3 1 , 32, 3 2 , 3
 ***
              * * *
tt t t t t
ttt t
S a S S TA GD TA GD TA GD
TA GD TA GD TA GD u
φφ β β γ
γδ δ
−− =+ + + + + +
++ ++24
            (14)
The estimation results for all three countries are reported in Table 7. Starting
with Greece 
24, the cross-country effects are not very informative. In particular,
the Greek market share is insensitive to the location of terrorist activity in
Turkey. Finally, with respect to terrorist activity in Israel, the estimation results
indicate that the Greek market share significantly gains from rural terrorist
activity in Israel.
Moving to the case of Israel, domestic urban terrorism exerts a
significant a negative effect on domestic market share, which is on average -
0.44% (estimate of 1,I β ). Regarding cross-country effects, Israel’s market
share is positively affected by urban terrorism in Greece (estimate of
1,G γ 1.19). There is an additional effect due to rural terrorist activity in Greece,
which is negative but, in comparison to the urban effect, it is of smaller
magnitude in absolute terms. With respect to the location of terrorist incidents
in Turkey, the estimated value of  1,T δ  is significant, suggesting that Israel’s
market share gains significantly on average by 1.28% 
Turkey’s market share is responsive to domestic rural terrorist activity,
which induces a significant loss of 0.95% (estimate of 2,T β ). Given that the
PKK activities typically take place in such areas and they constituted the most
important incidents compared to other terrorist groups during our sample
period, this result is expected.  The results for cross-country effects indicate
that Turkey’s market share is sensitive to urban terrorist activities in Greece.
The estimated coefficient,  1,G γ , 0.83, indicates that Turkey’s market share
goes up by an average 0.83%. However, it is also negatively affected by rural25
terrorist activity in Greece. The coefficient estimate,  2,G γ  suggests that this
effect is 2.72 %. Finally, there was no significant effect due to the location of
Israel’s terrorist incidents.               
7.  Policy Implications and Conclusions
We have examined the effects of terrorism in a regional setting. Our
results broadly support the conclusions of Enders et al. (1992) that terrorism
matters for tourism. We have found evidence that terrorism in Israel and
Turkey significantly reduces tourist arrivals. One difference between Enders et
al. and our findings is that they find strong support for the significance of
terrorism in Greece while we do not. One reason for this different result would
be the different sample periods examined.  Enders et al. (1992) study covers
the 1970’s and 1980’s while we focus on 1990’s. It is possible that the
intensity of terrorism incidents has declined in 1990’s relative to that of 1980’s
in Greece and/or that Greek government has coped better with such incidents
in the 1990’s because they has learned from their experience with terrorism in
the past decades. 
When the terrorist incidents are decomposed into rural versus urban
areas, however, incidents in the urban areas tend to have a negative and
significant effect on tourist arrivals in Greece, supporting the findings of
Enders et al. (1992). Our findings indicate the importance of decomposing
terrorist incidents into different categories to truly identify the impact of
terrorism on tourism.  Overall, we have found that the intensity of causalities
and geographic location of incidents have significant own and cross-country
effects on the market shares of involved countries. Future research should26
focus on using more disaggregated terrorism data and provide more evidence
from other countries.
We have also found significant contagion effects from terrorism in the
region. There is evidence that, although terrorism may not directly affect
tourist arrivals in Greece, it still hurts Greece’s market share indirectly by
increasing Israel's relative market share. Additionally, we have documented
an effect of terrorism on the substitutability of market shares between Turkey
and Israel.  Again, the results are sensitive to the different categorization of
terrorist incidents.
Given the significant effects of terrorism in the region, it may be wise
for policymakers to establish and fund regional cooperation against terrorism
by creating a multinational organization that would foster the exchange of
information, cross-border investigations, and other cooperation. 
25 In addition,
joint military and police training exercises against terrorist attacks may result
in economies scale and, more importantly, may increase the effectiveness of
security enforcement. 
26 As a result, regional economic and political
relationships among the involved countries should also increase. This
represents an important opportunity especially for Turkey and Greece, who
have had experienced many years of political conflict. 
27 However, in recent
years, both countries have made a great progress in improving their
relationship, especially following the recent earthquakes in both countries.
Like natural disasters, terrorist threats in the region can be used positively to
cerate new opportunities to further enhance the growing political and
economic ties between the two countries. 27
Table 1 Terrorist Incidents
                    Type of Incident \Country Greece Turkey Israel
Bombing 14 5 11
Shooting 1 4 8
Kidnapping 0 2 0
Incendiary Device 2 1 0
Rocket Attack 3 1 0
Hijacking 0 4 0
Arson 0 2 0
Suicide Bomb 0 4 10
Car Bomb 0 1 4
Knife Attack 0 0 4
Handgrenade 0 0 2
Other 0 0 2
Total number of incidents 20 24 41
Table 2 Relative Market Shares: January 1996 to December 1999
Greece Turkey Israel Italy
Mean 15.66 17.78 5.40 61.15
Maximum 25.96 26.73 12.76 73.90
Minimum 0.87 9.78 1.84 51.86
Std. Dev. 7.41 4.09 3.10 5.47
Observations 48 48 48 48
Notes: Market shares presented as a percentage. 
Table 3 Bivariate Market Share Sample Correlations










Notes: The asterisk denotes (one-tailed) significance at the 1 percent level.28
Table 4a Estimation Results based on the Raw Market Share and unconstrained (allowing for
asymmetry) Γ matrix 
t I t I I I t T T I t G G I t I I t I I I t I
t T t I I T t T T T t G G T t T T t T T T t T
t G t I I G t T T G t G G G t G G t G G G t G
u TA TA TA S S S
u TA TA TA S S S
u TA TA TA S S S
, , , , , , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , ,
, , , , , , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , ,
, , , , , , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , ,
+ + + + + + =
+ + + + + + =




γ γ γ β β α
γ γ γ β β α
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*** 2.40 2.19 2.38 3.58
Turkey 0.66 16.00
*** 0.30 2.07 0.71 1.81
Israel 0.80 33.58
*** 0.08 1.94 1.90 3.28
Notes: White heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-ratios in parentheses. One, asterisk denotes
significance at the 10 percent level, while two and three asterisks denote significance at the 5
and 1 percent respectively. Adj. R
2, F-stat, LM(1) serial correlation, ARCH(1), DW and J-B
stand for the adjusted coefficient of determination, the overall  statistical significance of the
regression equation, the Lagrange Multiplier serial correlation statistic, the Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedascticity test, the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Jarque-Bera
normality test, respectively.   29
Table 4b Estimation Results based on the Raw Market Share and unconstrained (allowing for
asymmetry) Γ matrix and including seasonal dummies 
t I
i
i i T t I I I t T T I t G G I t I I t I I I t I
t T
i
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*** 0.26 1.81 0.14 3.11
Turkey 0.93 25.21
*** 3.68 2.29 1.09 2.25
Israel 0.97 69.37
*** 0.45 1.80 0.12 0.54
Notes: White heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-ratios in parentheses. One, asterisk denotes
significance at the 10 percent level, while two and three asterisks denote significance at the 5
and 1 percent respectively. Adj. R
2, F-stat, LM(1) serial correlation, ARCH(1), DW and J-B
stand for the adjusted coefficient of determination, the overall  statistical significance of the
regression equation, the Lagrange Multiplier serial correlation statistic, the Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedascticity test, the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Jarque-Bera
normality test, respectively. The coefficients (and the respective t-ratios) associated with the
seasonal dummies are not reported for brevity, they are however available upon request.  
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Table 5 Hypothesis Testing Results (based on estimation with raw market shares without
seasonal dummies)



























Notes: Wald statistics with probability values in parentheses. One, asterisk denotes
significance at the 10 percent level, while two and three asterisks denote significance at the 5
and 1 percent respectively. 31
 Table 6 Decomposition in terms of the Intensity of attacks
() () () ()
() () () ()
() ()
0 1 1,1 2 2,1 1 ,1 1,1 2 ,1 2,1 3 ,1 3,1 ,1
1 ,2 1,2 2 ,2 2,2 3 ,2 3,2 1 ,3 1,3
2, 3 2 , 33, 3 3 , 3
 ***
              * * * *
              * *
tt t t t t
tttt
tt t
S a S S TA LD TA LD TA LD
TA LD TA LD TA LD TA LD
TA LD TA LD u
φφ β β β
γγ γδ
δδ













*** 1,I φ 1.23
(13.51)





*** 2,I φ -0.67
(-5.22)





** 1,I β -0.97
(-3.54)



















































*** 2 R 0.78
*** 2 R 0.59
***








ARCH(1) 2.99 ARCH(1) 2.63 ARCH(1) 1.79
J-B 6.85
** J-B 2.59 J-B 0.04
Notes: The country index is 1, 2, 3 since we are modelling a three-way competition. The
index in the equation is country-free, that is it represents the typical equation we use. The
exact identification of countries with the index follows a rolling fashion and depends on which
country’s market share is modelled. For instance, when Turkey is analyzed, we assign 1 to
Turkey, 2 to Greece and 3 to Israel. In the tables, we identify each country’s coefficients by
using the country name’s first letter as a subscript.     32
Table 7 Decomposition in terms of the location of attacks
() () () ( )
() () ()
0 1 1,1 2 2,1 1 ,1 1,1 2 ,1 2,1 1 ,2 1,2 ,1
2, 2 2 , 21, 3 1 , 32, 3 2 , 3
 ***
              * * *
tt t t t t
ttt t
S a S S TA GD TA GD TA GD
TA GD TA GD TA GD u
φφ β β γ
γδ δ









1,G φ  1.20
(6.26)
*** 1,I φ 1.20
(14.83)





*** 2,I φ -0.63
(-5.33)





* 1,I β -0.44
(-2.41)













*** 1,G γ 0.83
(2.43)
***




*** 2,G γ -2.72
(-4.30)
***




*** 2,I δ 0.59
(1.29)
2,I δ  0.99
(1.98)





*** 2 R 0.78
*** 2 R 0.63
***












Notes: For the case of Greece we can only apply the geographic decomposition since in our
sample there were no fatal terrorist incidents. So, in both decompositions Greek entries
correspond to geographic decomposition. The numbers in parentheses are the White
heteroscedasticity adjusted t-ratios. One, two, three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent level respectively. For brevity we do not report the estimates and t-ratios for the
intercepts terms.  See also notes to Table 6.33












Notes: GS, TS, ISS and ITS stand for Greece’s, Turkey’s, Israel’s and Italy’s market shares
(in percentages) respectively in the four-country market.  
Figure 2 Residuals and Actual vs Fitted series for Greece (based on estimation with raw
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Figure 3 Residuals and Actual vs Fitted series for Turkey (based on estimation with raw
market shares without seasonal dummies)
Figure 4 Residuals and Actual vs Fitted series for Israel (based on estimation with raw
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Appendix
Table 4c Estimation Results based on the Raw Market Share and constrained (imposing
symmetry) Γ matrix 
t I t I I I t T T I t G G I t I I t I I I t I
t T t I I T t T T T t G G T t T T t T T T t T
t G t I I G t T T G t G G G t G G t G G G t G
u TA TA TA S S S
u TA TA TA S S S
u TA TA TA S S S
, , , , , , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , ,
, , , , , , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , ,
, , , , , , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , ,
+ + + + + + =
+ + + + + + =




γ γ γ β β α
γ γ γ β β α
γ γ γ β β α
Subject to:
G I I G T I I T G T T G , , , , , , γ γ γ γ γ γ= ∧ = ∧ =
Greece




















































Likelihood Ratio test for the validity of the symmetry of the impact matrix: 5.12 (Chi-
square critical value at 5% level: 7.82)
Notes: White heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-ratios in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.   36
Table 4d Estimation Results based on the Raw Market Share and constrained (imposing
symmetry) Γ matrix and including seasonal dummies 
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Likelihood Ratio test for the validity of the symmetry of the impact matrix: 0.25 (Chi-
square critical value at 5% level: 7.82)
Notes: White heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-ratios in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4e Estimation Results based on the Seasonally Adjusted Market Share and unconstrained
(allowing for asymmetry) Γ matrix 
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Greece  0.00 1.01 3.36 1.70 1.16 12.56
Turkey  0.74 31.66
*** 0.18 2.02 0.30 2.24
Israel  0.53 11.98
*** 0.00 1.92 0.03 0.81
Notes: White heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-ratios in parentheses. One, asterisk denotes
significance at the 10 percent level, while two and three asterisks denote significance at the 5
and 1 percent respectively. Adj. R
2, F-stat, LM(1) serial correlation, ARCH(1), DW and J-B
stand for the adjusted coefficient of determination, the overall  statistical significance of the
regression equation, the Lagrange Multiplier serial correlation statistic, the Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedascticity test, the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Jarque-Bera
normality test, respectively.38
Table 4f Estimation Results based on the Seasonally Differenced Market Share and
unconstrained (allowing for asymmetry) Γ matrix 
t I t I I I t T T I t G G I t I I I t I
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Greece  -0.06 0.48 4.04
** 1.54 0.06 9.75
***
Turkey  0.53 10.91
*** 0.22 1.74 0.00 4.50
Israel 0.64 16.41
*** 0.06 1.84 0.60 0.82
Notes: White heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-ratios in parentheses. One, asterisk denotes
significance at the 10 percent level, while two and three asterisks denote significance at the 5
and 1 percent respectively. Adj. R
2, F-stat, LM(1) serial correlation, ARCH(1), DW and J-B
stand for the adjusted coefficient of determination, the overall  statistical significance of the
regression equation, the Lagrange Multiplier serial correlation statistic, the Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedascticity test, the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Jarque-Bera
normality test, respectively. ∆12 is the seasonal differencing operator. 39
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Endnotes
                                                
1 It is important to note that Hall (1995) does not provide any empirical estimates supporting
his figures. In this sense, his analysis is purely descriptive.
2 There have been many influential empirical studies examining the impact of terrorism from
different perspectives. Atkinson et al. (1987) present empirical evidence that increases in
bargaining costs lengthen a terrorist incident. Enders et al. (1990) investigate the
effectiveness of several terrorist-thwarting polices undertaken during the 1970’s and 1980’s.
Holden (1987) tests for the effects of previous successful hijackings on the subsequent rate of
hijacking attempts.
3 Due to lack of data for the whole Mediterranean region, we have chosen Italy as a proxy for
representing tourist activities in the rest of the region. The significance of adding Italy in our
framework is discussed in Section 3.
4 The theoretical framework on terrorism-related issues in the literature is growing. Many
studies have applied formal modelling such as game theory and constrained optimisation
techniques to a variety of issues. Influential studies include applications to negotiation
responses (Atkinson et. al, 1987 and Lapan and Sandler, 1988), retaliatory reactions of
governments (Lee, 1988), resource assignment for thwarting terrorism (Sandler et al., 1983
and Im, 1987), the choice of targets by terrorists (Sandler and Lapan, 1988), and the prey-
predator aspects of terrorism (Feichtinger et al., 2001)
5 Gross substitutability is broadly defined as a negative correlation between marker shares.
More discussion of this can be found in section 4.2.
6  Based on 1999 figures, Italy is ranked as the 4
th tourist destination in the world with a
market share of about 10 percent in terms of tourist arrivals (World Trade Organization,
2001).
7 To be precise, “safer” when compared to the three countries considered. During our sample
period, there were only 8 incidents, resulting in 1 dead and a few injuries. In contrast, As
Table 1 indicates, terrorist incidents in other countries were about 3 to 5 times higher.
8 One could argue that the market share would be affected by “nominal” exchange rates. As
Enders et al. (1992, footnote 5) argue, the key issue is the relative price of tourism.  Nominal
variables therefore cannot be used to represent relative prices. Our dependent variable is a
real variable and therefore we need to rely on real variables. However, Enders et al. (1992)
argue that using “real” exchange rate data as a proxy for the relative price of tourism may not
be satisfactory. They correctly point out that tourism shares are stationary while real
exchange rates are nonstationary and it is therefore not appropriate to regress a stationary
variable against nonstationary series. In addition, they argue that available real exchange rate
series are heavily weighted towards manufactures, instead of tourism services. For these
reasons, we do not use real exchange rates in our estimations.
9 Of course similar decompositions can be defined for Turkey and Israel.
10 This setup parallels the mean-variance principle in portfolio analysis where one considers
risky assets versus riskless assets. We thank Dimitris Georgarakos for pointing out to us the
similarity.
11 From a modelling approach, this case is less appealing since one would require stability of
preferences. However, we feel it is worth mentioning.
12 The plots for the raw market shares appear in the appendix (Figures 1).42
                                                                                                                                           
13 The full set of diagnostics is not reported for space considerations. They are available upon
request from the authors. The graphs of the residual series as well as the fitted values and
the actual series appear in the Figures section.
14 As discussed earlier, a set of other models (seasonally adjusted, seasonally differenced)
were also estimated as a means of conducting a sensitivity analysis. The results from these
appear in the Appendix (Tables 4c-4e). In general our basic findings are not sensitive to
alternative specifications, although a number of discrepancies between models are present.
We choose to work with the generic model (whose estimation results are reported in Table
4a) since the rest of the specifications either do not ‘pass’ the diagnostic tests or do not ‘fit’
adequately the data.
15  We also tested for the significance of past terrorist incidents on today’s tourist arrivals by
adding one lagged term for terrorist incidents in estimations. These terms were not
statistically significant. These results are available from the authors upon request.
16 Note that the evidence for Greece is very marginal. Assuming a 10 percent significance
level, the own impact of terrorist attacks in Greece becomes insignificant.
17 We elaborate on this case, because it appears to be the most significant in statistical terms.
Of course a similar exercise can be conducted for Turkey and Israel.
18 Unfortunately we do not have data for tourism income for the whole sample so we provide
the relevant figures for 1999 as an approximate value.
19  We attempted to replicate our estimations using the percentage change in tourist arrivals
as the dependent variable. The results were not satisfactory, indicating that use of  the market
shares as a dependent variable is a better way to study the effects of terrorism.
20 Conditional in the sense that these dummies are operational only in the occurrence of a
terrorist incident. A third (fourth) dummy for the cases of location (intensity) is also defined but
excluded in order to avoid the traditional multicollinearity problem, that takes the value of one
when no terrorist incident took place and zero otherwise.
21 A major advantage of this approach is that one has very clear priors as far as the sign of
the ' s α and  's β are concerned, which should be negative in order to capture the own effect
of domestic terrorism on the country’s market share. However, this does come at a cost,
namely one can apply one decomposition at a time since simultaneous inclusion of the
geographic dummies and intensity dummies result in multicollinearity. This so because of the
way the explanatory variables have been defined. It should be noted that this is irrelevant to
the standard multicollinearity problem. The intuition is that the total effect of terrorism can be
decomposed in one dimension each time. That is either in terms of location or level.
Similarly, if cross-county effects are considered, one has clear priors regarding the sign of the
estimated parameters. Therefore, provided that consumers treat tourist services from different
countries as (im)perfect substitutes, the cross-country ' s α and  's β should be positive.
22 At least for the cases of significant parameters.
23 It should be noted that for the case of Greece we can only apply the geographic
decomposition since in our sample there were no fatal terrorist incidents. So, in both
decompositions Greek entries correspond to geographic decomposition.
24 The own-country effects for Greece are identical in both specifications (see endnote 4).43
                                                                                                                                           
25  Following the September 11 attacks in the U.S., the European Commission formally
proposed several EU-wide measures against terrorism, including better cross-border
investigations, search and arrest warrants, and a minimum prison term of 20 years (“EU
Moves to Unify Fight Against Terrorism”, Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2001, A 16.)
26  Israel and Turkey already have been enjoying such an alliance since both countries signed
a military training and cooperation agreement in February 1996. This agreement provides
joint military exercise opportunities and exchange of information. This cooperation could be
extended to terrorism issues.
27 This is particularly important for Turkey. Policymakers in Turkey can use their experience
with terrorism to further improve their relationships with EU countries and thus their changes
for full EU membership. According to recent news, the foreign ministers of EU member
countries plan to discuss issues concerning terrorism with Turkey during their regular monthly
meetings. More specifically, the European Council will be informed about recent political
developments in Turkey and it will also evaluate Turkey's position in regards to the European
Security and Defense Policy. Such meetings are important for Turkey to further improve her
cooperation between EU members (“EU Council to meet to discuss Turkey, terrorism”,
October 8, 2001, Turkish Daily News
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/for.htm#f9)2008
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